The aim of the paper is to propose a model, namely Delta-Gamma Sensitivity AnalysisExtreme Value Theory (DGSA-EVT). DGSA-EVT is a model to measure HF-LS and LF-HS type of operational risks. The first leg of the proposed model, namely DGSA, is a methodology that deals with propagation of errors in the value adding activities which works by using measures of fluctuations in the activities.
INTRODUCTION
The complexity of operational risk measurement has been exacerbated by two major dimensions of operational risk data, namely high frequency-low severity (HF-LS) and low frequency-high severity (LF-HS) 1 , and the integration of scaling external and internal data 2 . Consequently, each type requires a different approach to cater for operational risk. The current literature on operational risk almost exclusively focuses on two issues: firstly, the estimation of operational risk loss processes using extreme value theory or Cox processes 3 , and secondly, the application of these estimates to the determination of economic capital 4 . In the estimation of economic capital for operational risk, the estimates appear to be quite large, in fact, at least as large as that necessary to cover market risk 5 . As evidenced by the references mentioned earlier that the modelling and estimation of operational risk is treated identically to market and credit risk, i.e., a loss process is modelled and estimated. However, this is where the similarity comes to an end. Unlike market and credit risk, which are external to the bank in their origin, operational risk is internal to the bank.
An intensive use of Value at Risk (VaR) has also taken place in the measurement of risk exposure in financial institutions. For a long time, economists have considered empirical behaviour models of banks where these institutions maximise some utility criteria under a solvency constraint of VaR type 6 . Similarly, other researchers have studied optimal portfolio selection under limited downside risk as an alternative to traditional mean-variance efficient frontiers 7 . Moreover, internal use of VaR by financial institutions has also been addressed in a delegated risk management framework in order to mitigate agency problems 8 .
Despite a growing interest in VaR related to credit risk and market risk; there is, unfortunately, a very limited research in the area of operational risk. Nevertheless, there has not been any research dealing with the theoretical properties of risk measures and their consequences on operational risk measurement in Islamic banking. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) as one of regulatory bodies in Islamic banking industry in its draft No. 2 on Capital Adequacy Standard 9 mentions the definition of operational risk and proposes Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) and the Standardised Approach (TSA) as methods to calculate operational risk capital. The proposed methods are basically meant for the calculation of capital which needs to be kept aside in order to cater for operational risks. There is, however, an essential step which is overlooked, namely a method to measure the magnitude of operational risk exposures.
10 The paper, hence, provides a proposed measurement approach to fill this gap 11 .
The proposed model, namely Delta-Gamma Sensitivity Analysis-Extreme Value Theory (DGSA-EVT), is a model to measure HF-LS and LF-HS type of operational risks. The first leg of the proposed model, namely DGSA, is a methodology that deals with propagation of errors in the value adding activities which works by using measures of fluctuations in the activities. The sensitivities of the output, hence, are deployed to estimate the performance volatility. Through operating loss distribution that is the result of the entire quantification process, DGSA would help in generating the level of operational value at risk (OpVaR) of the analysed Islamic banks. Furthermore, the second leg of the proposed model, Extreme Value Theory (EVT), is a technique to cater for an excess operational loss over a defined threshold which is normally characterised by low frequency and high severity (LF-HS) type of loss.
The second section of the paper reviews in some more detail the existing models in operational risk measurement and its classifications. The third section explains the theoretical background of the proposed model and its features. In the fourth section, attention is focused on the empirical aspect of the proposed model. The paper concludes with a fifth section, which includes practical suggestions and some direction for future research.
REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL RISK MODELLING
Modelling operational risk ranges from mathematical to statistics-econometrical approach which is designed to measure the regulatory and economic operational risk capital. Different models are also designed to study causes and consequences of operational risk. Surely, a constantly changing financial environment has made modelling of operational risk vital 12 . Furthermore, operational risk modelling is also needed to provide bank management with a tool to make a better decision in carrying out a desirable level of operational risk management. It is also suggested that the only feasible way to effectively manage operational risk is by identifying and minimising it, which requires the development of adequate quantification techniques 13 . As a matter of fact, quantification of operational risk is a prerequisite for the formulation of an effective operational risk management and a sound economic capital framework 14 .
Taxonomy of Operational Risk Modelling
The paper broadly classifies modelling in operational risk into three classes; (i) process approach, (ii) factor approach, and (iii) actuarial approach. It should also be noted that a 10 This shortcoming is also reflected in the studies by Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Hassan and Dicle, 2005; Ismail and Sulaiman ,2005; Kahf,2005; Muljawan, 2005; and Sundararajan, 2005. 11 It is expected that the proposed approach will result in an operational risk capital charge that credibly reflects the operational risk profile of the bank. This is the essence of Operational Risk Management System (ORMS) which consists of the systems and data used to measure operational risk in order to estimate the operational risk capital charge. ORMS is a subset of Operational Risk Management Framework (ORMF 
Process approach
It is an approach that focuses on the chain of activities that comprise an operation or transaction (in much the same way that an industrial engineer examines a manufacturing process by looking at the individual work stations). Examples of this approach include:  Causal models; it attempts to look at a specific outcome (for example, a settlement payment) in terms of the probabilistic impact of the activities that are in the chain (for example, recognition that a payment date has occurred, calculation of the settlement amount, notification of the counterparty, and paying or receiving). The success of each activity in the chain might be modelled as a function of inputs.  Reliability analysis; it is used in operational research to measure the impact of failure of components in complex mechanical/electronic system. However, it is also widely implemented in operational risk to estimate the hazard rate of arrival of failure (operational risk event)  Connectivity; which requires the modelling process to develop a ‗connectivity matrix' that can then be used to estimate the likelihood of failure (or potential losses) for the process as a whole.
Three additional techniques that could be considered ‗process' approaches are:  Bayesian belief network, which extends the ‗causal model' technique by treating the initial model as the null hypothesis, and so, as data is collected, the model can be tested to provide a more accurate picture of the process.  Fuzzy logic is a branch of mathematics that facilitates decision-making when some of the inputs are vague, or if they are subjective judgements. In a ‗causal model', fuzzy logic could provide a way to aggregate the subjective drivers of a process.  System dynamics, which extends the ‗connectivity' approach; it is carried out by making the connections between dynamic activities. This technique requires a development of the model to simulate the cause-effect interactions among activities that make up the processes within the firm.
Factor Approach
A factor approach was initiated as an attempt to identify the significant determinants of operational risk -either at the institutional level or at the level of an individual business or individual process. The objective is to obtain an equation that relates the level of operational risk for institution i (or business i or process i) to a set of factors:
The key element of factor approach is the identification of appropriate factors in order to obtain the measures of the parameters α, β ,and γ. As a result, an estimation of the level of operational risk that will exist in future periods can be materialised. In the analysis of operational risk quantification, Smith and Song (2004) 
Actuarial Approach
An actuarial approach attempts to identify the loss distribution associated with operational risk -either at the level of an institution or at the level of a business or process.  Empirical loss distribution, is the most straightforward way to estimate the loss distribution, using the institution's own data on losses or both internal data and (properly scaled) external data. However, empirical loss distributions will probably suffer from limited data points (especially in the tail of the distribution).  Explicit distributions parameterized using historical data is one way to get around the sparse data problem. The analyst specifies a distributional form for the loss distribution or a distribution for the frequency of occurrence of losses and a different distribution for the severity of the losses.  Extreme value theory provides another way of getting around the data sparseness problem. This theory is an area of statistics concerned with modelling the limiting behaviour of sample extremes, which indicates that, for a large class of distributions, losses in excess of a high enough threshold all follow the same distribution (a generalised Pareto distribution).
Empirical Research in Islamic Banking
In the IFSB Draft No. 2 on Capital Adequacy Standard, operational risk is defined as the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal risk and Shariah compliance risk (IFSB, 2005: 22) 16 . This definition is rather different from Basel 2 on operational risk 17 . However, IFSB adopts Basel 2's methodology in the calculation of a minimum capital requirement for 5 operational risk exposure. Four methods have been proposed by the Basel; namely the Basic Indicator approach (BIA), the Standardised approach (TSA), the Alternative Standardised approach (ASA) and the Advanced Measurement approach (AMA). BIA takes the moving average of gross income as a proxy of the size of operational risk exposure and suggests a parameter of 15% to calculate the minimum capital required to stand for this kind of risk. TSA is a little more refined as it takes average gross income at the activity level after dividing a bank's activities into 8 categories and suggests a parameter for each of them ranging between 12 and 18 percent. Under the ASA, for retail and commercial banking business lines, loans and advances replace gross income as the proxy indicator. Finally, AMA allows using internal measurement methodologies to calculate the minimum capital requirement for operational risk exposure provided the bank satisfies certain qualification criteria to assure the supervisory authority of the existence of efficient and independent operational risk management system and of its ability to fairly estimate operational risk and the capital needed to face it, including the expected losses as well as the unexpected losses.
The IFSB standards provide fairly detailed guidance on adaptation of Basel 2 to the specific risk characteristics of Islamic banks. In particular, the IFSB draft proposes an adaptation of standardised approach to operational risk measurement-based on externally provided rating categories-and within this framework allows supervisory discretion to recognise the extent of risks assumed by the PSIA's 18 in computing capital adequacy for Islamic banks. Kahf opposes the use of gross income as a proxy of operational risk exposure as set out by IFSB 19 . In this respect, his argument is in line with Sundararajan who argued that the use of gross income as the basic indicator for operational risk measurement could be misleading in Islamic Banks, as large volume of transactions in commodities, and the use of structure finance raise operational exposures that will not be captured by gross income.
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However, Sundararajan still supports the standardised approach that allows for different business lines to be better suited, but would still need adaptation to the needs of Islamic banks.
Some empirical aspects of the operational soundness in Islamic banks were studied by Ismail and Suleiman (2005) , Hassan and Dicle (2005) and Muljawan (2005) There are two things that can be highlighted from the review above; first, it is clear that the empirical research that have been conducted are on the aspect of capital attribution for operational risk; second, there is no unanimous standard of operational risk measurement method. The most recent research on this issue was conducted by Jackson-Moore; nevertheless, the writer could not come up with a conclusive suggestion on the refined measurement method.
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The following section attempts to discuss the proposed framework in measuring operational risk exposures in Islamic banks.
DELTA-GAMMA SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (DGSA): A PROPOSED APPROACH
The objective of operational risk management is to decide which risks are important to the bank so that it could determine their magnitude and mitigate them accordingly. Therefore a refined measurement method is required to provide a measure that has a defined relationship to a risk factor that can be assigned as controllable or uncontrollable. This would result in the determination of an appropriate intervention for controllable risks by focusing on their causes. Given the foregoing discussion, the impact on operations can be separated into controllable risk and uncontrollable risk. In this study, a controllable risk is defined as any risk which has assignable causes that can be influenced. Generally, process-related risks will have assignable causes and therefore, they are controllable. For instance, classifying loan customers into the wrong credit categories can result in substantial differences in the default rates and loan provision requirements and is an example of a risk that is controllable because the cause is known.
Uncontrollable risk, on the other hand, is defined as any risk that does not have causal factors that can be influenced. Their impact is determined through loss models that analyse extreme values (losses), and use classification instead of causes. Ideally, extreme loss models will be used with scenarios that provide stress points for the analysis. Uncontrollable does not mean that there is nothing that can be done about it. There are many mitigation strategies that can be implemented in order to reduce the effects of a loss. Also, uncontrollable risks may become controllable if an assignable cause can be found and which would enable the management to carry out a corrective action.
The proposed DGSA deals with controllable risks; in other words, DGSA is designed to measure the magnitude of operational risk exposures which can be controlled, or HF-LS type of operational risks. 
Building Blocks of DGSA
The analysis of DGSA begins by developing a function for a value adding process and then examining the key factors that contribute to the performance and their associated errors (uncertainties). This can be done by partitioning the business unit into different income generating channels (IGCs). IGCs contain different earnings function as the unit of analysis for measuring operational risk, as shown in Figure 1 .
Income generating channels can be defined as the production unit by which a bank creates a product valuable to its customers. An activity in the income generating channels employs purchased inputs, human resources, capital, and some form of technology to perform its function 26 . Since a business unit has profit and loss reporting (by definition), its income generating processes are the key components that make up the profit and loss for the business unit. In our model, Islamic banks business model can be partitioned into three income generating channels, namely; (a) investment channel, (b) financing channel, and (c) service channel. a. Investment channel, which comprises any investment in the form of a partnership. There are two types of investing instruments: fund management (mudarabah) and equity partnership (musharakah). Mudarabah, which can be short, medium, or long term, is a trust-based financing agreement whereby an investor entrusts capital to an agent to undertake a project. Profits are based on a pre-agreed ratio. Musharakah, which can be either medium or long term, is a hybrid of shirka (partnership) and mudarabah, combining the act of investment and management. In the absence of debt security, the Shariah encourages this form of financing. b. Financing channel, which contains any financing instruments that are used primarily to finance obligations arising from the trade and sale of commodities or property. Financing instruments also include instruments generating rental cash flows against exchange of rights to use the assets such as ijarah and istisna'. Financing instruments are closely linked to a sale contract and therefore are collateralised by the product being financed. These instruments are the basis of short-term assets for the Islamic banks. Murabahah, a cost-plus sales contract, is one of the most popular contracts for purchasing commodities and other products on credit.
c. Service channel; consists of any financial transactions that create earnings by charging fees, an example of which is ju'ala.
For each income generating channel, an earning figure can be located and linked up with causal factors for the business. Causal factors can be defined as factors that have impacts on earnings. In other words, DGSA uses risk factors resulting from causal factors that create losses with a random uncertainty to measure the variability of earnings.
In contrast, un-assignable loss cannot be tied to a risk factor since the cause is normally unknown or is due to an external event. Based on the causality between risk factors contributing to assignable losses, an earning function can be produced in each income generating channel. The DGSA methods use factors which lead to loss and their sensitivities to generate loss distributions in different business units. It is worth noting here that losses within business units are not normally accounted for in a systematic way that would allow their direct assignment to risk factors. Since there are a large number of small losses, many banks simply aggregate operational losses in general accounts along with other entries. They may be included as a cost of doing business or simply mixed up in the profit and loss accounting. Without having a loss figure that can be linked to risk factors, therefore, it is almost impossible to produce a direct measurement of operational risk caused by assignable loss. Hence the DGSA method can overcome this problem. 
Operating Loss Distribution (OLD)
Value at Risk for Operational Losses
Decide maximum OLD as a threshold (µ) 9
In summary, the steps of building DGSA frameworks are as follows:
1) Establish the business model with income generating channel 2)
Determine the risk factors for the major activities in the income generating channel 3)
Determine the relations between risk factors and earning through setting up earnings function in different income generating channel 4)
Estimate operational losses using uncertainty of the risk factors propagated to the risk in earnings (Delta-Gamma method) 5)
Set the threshold of operating losses from the processes using the risk factor uncertainties and operating losses from Delta-Gamma method 6)
Filter the large losses using the threshold.
Key Features of DGSA
The DGSA methodology is the calculation technique to determine the value of the assignable losses based on the sensitivity causality between the risk factors. DGSA is produced through error propagation of the risk factors to measure operational risk. The uncertainty of the risk factors is utilised to calculate the uncertainty in earnings using sensitivities from which the relation of the change in earnings to a change in the risk factors can be located.
In DGSA, operational risk is measured as the uncertainty in earnings due to two parts. First, using the uncertainty in causal factors for losses up to a threshold and second, using a large loss model for un-assignable loss above a threshold. Causality model, hence, plays a critical role in determining the risk factors establishing the model. Hence, the combination of the two constitutes DGSA and is described by the operational risk formula as follows:
Uncertainty in earnings due to operational risk is a function of the uncertainties in a set of risk factors plus a function of the distribution of un-assignable losses larger than a given threshold (μ). DGSA method is used to calculate the first term in the model. This model expresses the uncertainty in earnings as a function of the uncertainty in a set of risk factors:
DGSA method for measuring operational risk is based on the five following key concepts: 1.
Earnings as a function of causal factors. In DGSA method, it is assumed that earnings are described by a series of causal factors. For a given earnings level, there is a set of causal factors whose values are used to estimate earnings:
Earnings are described as a function of a set of causal factors. For example, earnings may be calculated as 20% of sales revenue minus an adjustment for rejects. By separating the causal factors into constants and volatilities, earnings can be described by a set of performance drivers that create the expected level of earnings and a set of risk factors that create volatility in the level of earnings (risk):
Earnings are described as a function of performance drivers for level and risk factors for volatility. Therefore, in the model, earnings are calculated as 20% of sales revenue minus the variance to target cost for rejects. ‗Sales revenue' is the performance driver and ‗rejects' is the risk.
2.
The risk in earnings is a random fluctuation in value caused by uncertainty in the risk factors. Given
3. The basic measure of uncertainty for operational risk is the standard deviation of the mean, or standard error.
In general, the standard deviation of the mean of the measured values is referred to as the standard error or simply the error
27
. It is calculated from a sample of n measures using the following formula:
Whereby x is the mean of the analysed operational risk variable.
4.
Uncertainties are combined using the formula for the expected value of the sum of variances.
This formula is given for the simple case of correlation values of only 0 or 1, corresponding to independent analysed operational risk variables and others that are perfectly correlated. Normally this should be sufficient for operational risk measures.
Formula for combining uncertainties using standard errors where the i's are uncorrelated and the j's are correlated (perfectly) measures.
5.
Uncertainties for functions of uncertainty measures are calculated using the law of error propagation. For each risk factor, the sensitivity of the earnings with respect to the factor is needed. The sensitivity is the amount of change in earnings given a single unit change in the factor with everything else remaining unchanged, or the partial derivative of the earnings function with respect to the factor. Given the earnings function that expresses earnings as a function of a factor
The method of combining measurement uncertainties from various factors and accounting for their correlation is known as the propagation of uncertainty. The basic formula uses the sensitivities (partial derivatives) of the factors to calculate the standard deviation of the estimate. It is based on a Taylor approximation for the uncertainty in terms of factors such as:
Using the Taylor approximation's first term, the uncertainty for the measure can be figured out using the following technique:
The formula shown above is the formula for the calculation of combined uncertainty from many factors, also known as the ‗general law of error propagation'. Where ) ( u  denotes the uncertainty in the value, r is the risk measurement, x is the factor, and f is the functional relationship between x and r. The partial derivative term is known as the sensitivity to the factor. This formula also explicitly considers correlation between factors ij  .
6. The gamma (  ) of a portfolio on an underlying assets is the rate of change of the portfolio's delta with respect to the price of the underlying asset. While the delta is the first derivative of the model, the gamma is the second partial derivative of the portfolio with respect to different risk factors:
If the value of gamma is small, the delta changes slowly and adjustments to keep a portfolio delta neutral only need to be made relatively infrequently. However, if gamma is large in absolute terms, then delta is highly sensitive to the price of the underlying asset. It is then quite risky to leave a delta neutral portfolio unchanged for any length of time. In this study, gamma is an important factor in determining which risk factors are more influential to income generating channels.
It is expected that partnership type of financing, such as mudarabah and musharaka would give higher value since they are likely to increase the level of operational risk exposures.
7. Threshold; it is used to separate losses to be analysed using DGSA from those that are not assignable. As highlighted in the earlier paragraph, DGSA deals with small losses (HF-LS type of operational risks); hence, the threshold is the transition point from small loss (HF-LS) to large loss (LF-HS). However, to ensure that there will not be any overlap, meticulous calculations must be carried out to set the threshold precisely since losses assigned to risk factors using DGSA method are assumed to have random error properties. And DGSA is used to estimate the central tendency of this uncertainty.
Why Sensitivity Analysis?
The activity in the field of sensitivity analysis (SA) has been steadily growing, due to the increasing complexity of numerical models, whereby SA has acquired a key role in testing the correctness and corroborating the robustness of models in several disciplines. This has led to the development and application of several new SA techniques
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. Most of the recent literature in portfolio management has proposed SA approaches based on partial derivatives (PDs) 29 . Nevertheless, recent studies in the SA literature have highlighted that PDs-based SA suffers from several limitations when used for parameter impact evaluation and risk management purposes 30 . It is shown that a PDs-based SA to evaluate the impact of parameter changes with respect to the generic model output 31 :
1) is equivalent to neglecting the relative parameter changes, or, equivalently, to impose that all the parameters are varied in the same way; 2)
does not allow the appreciation of the model sensitivity to changes in groups of parameters Therefore, using Elasticity (E) is considered to be a better alternative as compared to PDs 32 . In this case limitation 2 would still be in place, as E is not additive; and limitation 1 would be replaced by introducing E to impose on any parameters that are changing by the same proportion.
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This study will show that the use of Differential Importance Measure (D) would overcome the two above mentioned limitations.
Let us consider the generic model output:
28 Studies by Borgonovo and Apostolakis, 2001a; Saltelli, 1997; Saltelli, 1999; Saltelli, Tarantolla and Chan, 1999; Turany and Rabitz, 2000 show the importance of sensitivity analysis approach in financial analysis. 29 As brought forward by Drudi, Generale and Majnoni, 1997; Gourieroux, Laurent and Scaillet, 2000; Manganelli, 2004; McNeal and Frey, 2000 D shares the additivity property with respect to the various inputs, for example, the impact of the change in some set of parameters coincides with the sum of the individual parameter impacts. More formally, let S  {1,2,…, n} identify some subset of interest of the input set; hence it would give: Equation (2) shows that D accounts for the relative parameters changes through the dependence on dx. In fact, equation (14) can be rewritten as:
In the hypothesis of uniform parameter changes (H1) (dx j =dx s  j,s), the following can be produced: 
It can be shown that D generalises other local SA techniques as the Fussel-Vesely importance measure and Local Importance Measure based on normalised partial derivatives, also known as Criticality Importance or E. More specifically, in case H2 it holds that 36 :
where Es(x 0 ) is the elasticity of Y wih respect to x s at x 0 . Equation (20) shows that E produces the importance of parameters for proportional changes.
DETERMINATION OF RISK FACTOR CONTRIBUTION
From the practitioners' viewpoint, a pertinent issue is how much each of the process contributes to the risk exposure 37 . If it turns out that only a fraction of all processes significantly contribute to the risk exposure, then the risk manager should only focus on this particular process. It is, therefore, important to analyse how much each single process contributes to the total risk. This study considers operational value at risk (OpVaR) resulting from operating loss distribution as a risk measure. To split up the risk into its process components, this study compares the incremental risk (IR) of the processes.
Let IR  (i) be the risk contribution of process i to OpVaR at the confidence level .
Where P\{i} is the whole set of workflows without process i. Since the sum over all IR  's is generally equal to the OpVaR, the relative incremental risk (RIC  (i)) of process i is defined as the IR  (i) normalised by the sum over all IR  , i.e.
as a further step, for each , this paper counts the number of processes that exceed a relative incremental risk of 1%. The resulting curve is attributed as parameter or the Risk Selection Curve (RiSC)
EXTREME VALUE THEORY (EVT)
Extreme value theory (EVT) is a field of study in statistics that focuses on the properties and behaviour of extreme events. In general, there are two main kinds of model for extreme values. The most traditional models are the block maxima models; these are models for largest observations collected from large samples of identically distributed observations. The second type of model which is more comprehensive is the peak over threshold (POT) model; this is a model for all large observations that exceed some high level, and is generally considered to be the most useful for practical applications, due to their more efficient use of the data (often limited) on extreme outcomes.
In our analysis, the application of EVT as the second leg of the proposed model starts after the determination of a transition point resulting from DGSA. It is important to note that the transition point is typically classified as the maximum threshold. EVT offers a parametric statistical approach for the extreme values of data. Its roots are in the physical sciences and it has recently been applied to insurance. Since traditional statistical techniques focus on measures of central tendency (e.g. mean), they are not as accurate when estimating values very far from the centre of the data. EVT, on the other hand, deals only with the extreme values and ignores the majority of the underlying data and its measures in order to provide better estimates of the ‗tails'.
The EVT methodology for operational risk is basically a loss model for large losses using a GPD for the severity. The technique for fitting the GPD to data is the peaks over threshold method (POT), where large values over a specific threshold are fitted to the GPD. Following , the POT method deployed in the analysis uses the following basic assumptions:
 The excesses of an independent identically distributed (or stationary) sequence over a high threshold u occur at the times of a Poisson process;  The corresponding excesses over u are independent and have a GPD;  Excesses and exceedance times are independent of each other.
Operating Framework for EVT
As depicted in Figure 2 , the steps for operating EVT in our analysis start with the separation of loss amount into its severity and frequency.
Furthermore, excess losses are fit to a GPD to determine the severity of a loss given that it exceeds the threshold. This is a conditional severity distribution for large losses. Since the number of exceedances follows a Poisson distribution, it is fitted and used to estimate the frequency of exceedances. Combining the severity and frequency distributions in a Monte Carlo simulation gives the excess loss distribution. The resulting excess loss distribution is a multi-period loss distribution for only those losses that exceed the threshold.
Figure 2. The Application of Extreme Value Theory for Operational Risk Measurement in Islamic Banks

Theoretical Building Blocks of EVT: Fisher-Tippet-Gnedenko Theorem
The Fisher-Tippet-Gnedenko theorem states that given a sample of independent identically distributed loss data x 1 ,x 2 ,…, x n , as the number of observations n becomes increasingly large, the maximum of the sequence of observations, under vert general conditions, is approximately distributed as the generalised extreme value (GEV) distribution with cumulative probability distribution function 
and  is the tail index parameter. The GEV has three forms; if >0, then the distribution takes the form of a type II (Frechet) heavy-tailed distribution. For <0, the distribution is takes the type III (Weibull) distribution. When =0, the distribution is the type I (Gumbel) light-tailed distribution. In fact, the larger the tail index parameter, the fatter is the tail.
Parameter Estimation
The parameter µ and σ can be estimated from the sample mean and sample standard deviation, respectively. If we rank the data in order size so that x 1 >x 2 >…>x n , the tail index parameter  can be estimated using the Hill estimator:
Method II:
The problem now is how to choose k. Theory gives little advices as to what value to choose. Furthermore, the actual estimate will be sensitive to the value of k chosen. In practice, the average estimator, using either of the following two formulas, often works well:
Method 2:
Severity Model
An alternative EVT approach to calculate OpVaR is to use peaks over threshold (POT) modelling. The underlying principle of the operating framework is to use peaks over threshold. Although the method of block maxima utilises the Fisher-Tippet-Gnedenko theorem to inform us what the distribution of the maximum loss is, POT uses the PicklandsDalkema-de Hann to inform us what is the probability distribution of all events greater than some large present threshold. The Picklands-Dalkema-de Hann theorem states that if F u is the conditional excess distribution function of values of the ordered losses X above some threshold, µ is given by
. Then for a suitably high threshold the limiting distribution of F u is a generalised Pareto distribution (GPD) with cumulative distribution function
where σ > 0, and x ≥ 0 when  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ -β/ when  < 0. The parameters  and β are referred to, respectively, as the shape and scale parameters. In other words, ys are called excesses whereas xs are called exceedances. It is possible to determine the conditional distribution function of the excesses (i.e, ys) as a function of x:
In this representations the parameters  is crucial, when  = 0, we have an exponential distribution; when  < 0, we have a Pareto distribution-II Type and when  > 0, we have Pareto distribution-I Type. Moreover, this parameter has a direct connection with the existence of finite moments of the losses distributions. We have the following equations:
Hence in the case of a GPD as a Pareto-I Type, when  ≥ 1, we have infinite mean models, as also shown by Moscadelli 39 and Neslehova et. al 40 .
Following Di Clemente-Romano 41 , we suggest to model the loss severity using the lognormal for the body of the distribution and EVT for the tail in the following way: An important issue to consider is the estimation of the severity distribution parameters. While the estimation maximum likelihood (ML) in the lognormal case is straightforward, in the EVT case, it is extremely important to consider whether ML or the alternative probability weighted moment (PWM) routines are able to capture the dynamics underlying losses severities.
With respect to ML, the log-likelihood function equals
This method works well if  > -1/2. In this case, it is possible to show that
Instead, the PWM consist of equating model moments based on a certain parametric distribution function to the corresponding empirical moments based on the data. Estimated based on PWM are often considered to be superior to standard moment-based estimates. In our case, this approach is based on these quantities:
From the above equations, it is possible to show that Hosking and Wallis 42 show that PWM is a viable alternative to ML when  ≥ 0. In our analysis, we estimated the GPD parameters using the previous approaches together with the standard Hill estimator.
Frequency Model
Having fitted a GPD to the amount of loss for a set of excess losses, the next step is to determine the frequency of losses using a Poisson distribution. The Poisson distribution is well known as a single parameter distribution for the number of occurrences of an event with relatively small probabilities given a relatively large sample. The formula for the Poisson distribution is
Formula for Poisson distribution of x events with single parameter λ, the arrival rate. The fitting of the Poisson to a set of occurrences proceeds using the inter-arrival times for the loss events. That is, the average time between events can be used to determine the arrival rate or lambda for the Poisson formula. (The arrival rate is simply the inverse of the inter-arrival time). For the Poisson distribution, it can be shown that the maximum likelihood estimator for λ is given by the mean arrival rate formula below k is the number of events in a period, n k is the number of periods with k events, n is the total number of periods.
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A goodness of fit statistic for the Poisson distribution can be found using a simple  2 -squared test. The test statistic is:
Chi-squared test statistic for the goodness of fit of the Poisson distribution to a set of data; where Pr(k; λ) is the probability of k events for the Poisson distribution with parameter λ. The degrees of freedom are n-2.
Compounding via Monte Carlo Methods
Once severity and frequency distributions have been estimated, it is necessary to compound them via Monte Carlo methods to get a new data series of aggregate losses, so that we can then compute the desired risk measures, such as the VaR and expected shortfall.
The random sum L=X 1 + … + X n (where N follows a Poisson distribution) have distribution function: (41) where F x (x) = Pr ( X ≤ x) = distribution function of the severities X i n * x F = n-fold convolution of the cumulative distribution function of X.
Hence, the aggregation of frequencies and severities is performed as a sum of severities distribution function convolutions, thus determining a compound distribution, whose density function can be obtained by:
This aggregation is computed via convolution using Monte Carlo methods. It should also be noted that the convolution is a bit more complex as the severity distribution is split in two parts: the body of the distribution, which follows a lognormal distribution, and the tail, which follows a GPD. As a result, two different severity levels are generated. Hence, the probability associated at each severity (i.e., the number of observations obtained by the Poisson distribution) has to be congruent with the fact that losses may belong to the body or to the tail. Therefore, it is crucial to consider F(u), where u is the GPD threshold and F is the distribution function associated to this point. After having sampled from the two severity distributions, every single loss X i whose F(Xi) < F(u) will be modeled as a lognormal variable, otherwise it will be a GPD random draw.
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , value at risk is generated from both processes, DGSA and EVT. As a result, an approximation of the magnitude of operational risk is generated by adding the value at risk resulting from DGSA and EVT processes.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Indeed, quantifying operational risk is a very challenging task. One of the main reasons is due to the diverse elements involved in the quantification process. Although the use of Basic Indicator and the Standardised approach in measuring operational risk exposures have been suggested by IFSB, however, both appraoches are somewhat inaccurate as the suggested methods are used to calculate operational risk capital. In other words, it is a requirement to set aside a certain amount of capital to cater for operational risk. Consequently, it will not come as a surprise that such an approach will result in a high or low of economic capital number; hence, operational risk capital is over estimated or under estimated.
Nonetheless, a very essential step which is actually overlooked in the process; that is the measurement of operational risks itself. In this respect, this paper proposes an approach for the measurement of operational risk, namely Delta Gamma Sensitivity Analysis-Extreme Value Theory. This model is an integrated measurement method which caters for two types of operational risks, namely high frequency-low severity (HF-LS) and low frequency-high severity (LF-HS) risks. The strength of the model lies in its accuracy in measuring the causality taking place in the value adding process in Islamic banking operations. Moreover, an elasticity based sensitivity analysis employed in the first leg of the model would be a better alternative to the common partial derivatives based sensitivity analysis since it would not neglect the relative parameter changes that occur in the causality models.
The proposed DGSA-EVT model would also give a number advantage to the operational risk managers; first, it is a reflection of potential loss that is not merely based on actual loss figure which is rarely available. This aspect is very crucial since in most cases, operational losses are not recorded, especially in an Islamic bank. To the best of the author's knowledge, there is not any single Islamic bank which discloses publicly the magnitude of its operational losses. Second, the models reflect the quality of the operations in the banks. Thus, it can be perceived that a bank with a better model is likely to have more effective operational risk management. Third, since the error rates are relative errors based on exposures, the models are related to the size of the firm's business.
Nevertheless, the paper is theoretical and analytical in nature. Testing the proposed model, therefore, is needed to assess the workability of the model. Indeed, it is a quite daunting task considering that data availability can be a hindrance to such a test.
APPENDIX
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The appendix discusses different dimensions of proposed operational risk categories (ORCs) in different types of Islamic financial contracts. As can be seen in the table below, the five dimensions of operational risk categories are Shariah compliance risk (SR), fiduciary risk (FR), people risk (PR), legal risk (LR), and technology risk (TR). The first three dimensions are, by nature, internally inflicted; while the fourth one is naturally from external source. As for technology risk (TR); it can originate from either internal or external operational failures. Any delay in payment of the capital and dispersal of the parties renders the transaction a sale of debt for debt, which is prohibited, and the scholars agreed on its prohibition. Another aspect, which might lead to SR may also occur in parallel salam; this will take place if the execution of the second salam contract is contingent on the execution of the first salam contract. Penalty clause is also not allowed, in the event of a seller's default in delivering the good. The basis for not allowing penalty in salam is because al-muslam fihi (the subject matter of a salam contract) is considered to be a debt; hence it is not permitted to stipulate payment in excess of the principal amounts of debt 46 .  Fiduciary risk (FR); salam is generally associated with the agricultural sector.
The buyer must either rejects goods of an inferior quality to that specified in the contract, or accept them at the original price. In the latter case, the goods would have to be sold at a discount (unless the customer under a parallel salam agreed to accept the goods at the originally agreed price).  People risk (PR); can arise due to a seller's default in delivering the commodity or due to the commodity's specification mismatching. Financial institutions may minimise such type of operational risks by asking from the seller guarantees that they are following a quality management system or Shariah compliant activities. A mixture of shares in one entity may lead to legal risk if the regulation does not allow doing such action.  Technology risk (TR); may occur due to an incompatibility of the new accounting software or losses of the precise information on projects undertaken due to external security breaches.
Mudarabah
Mudarabah is a profit sharing and loss bearing contract under which the financier (rab al mal) entrusts his funds to an entrepreneur (mudarib). The exposure of operational risk in mudarabah is somewhat similar to that of musharakah. However, since this type of contract may be used on the assets side of the balance sheet, as well as being used on the funding side for mobilising investment accounts, the operational risk is first analysed from the assets-side perspective and then from the funding side perspective (which is related to fiduciary risk)
Asset-side Mudarabah
Contractually, an Islamic bank has no control over the management of the business financed through this mode, the entrepreneur having complete freedom to run the enterprise according to his best judge judgement. The bank is contractually entitled only to share with the entrepreneur the profits generated by the venture according to the contractually agreed profit sharing ratio. The entrepreneur as mudarib does not share in any losses which are borne entirely by the rab al mal. The mudarib has an obligation to act in a fiduciary capacity as the manager of the bank's funds, but the situation gives rise to moral hazard especially if there is information asymmetry-that is, the bank does not receive regular and reliable financial reports on the performance of the mudarib. Hence, in addition to due diligence before advancing the funds, the bank needs to take precautions against problems of information asymmetry during the period of investment.
Funding-side Mudarabah
Profit-sharing (and loss bearing) investment accounts are a Shariah compliant alternative to conventional interest-bearing deposit account. Since a mudarabah contract is employed between the Islamic bank and its investment account holders, the investment account holders (IAHs) share the profits and bear all losses without having any control or rights of governance over the Islamic bank. In return, the Islamic bank has fiduciary responsibilities in managing the IAHs' funds. The IAHs typically expect returns on their funds that are comparable to the returns paid by competitors (both other Islamic banks and conventional institutions), but they also expect the Islamic bank to comply with Shariah rules and principles at all times. If the Islamic bank is seen to be deficient in its Shariah compliance, it is exposed to the risk of IAHs withdrawing their funds and, in serious cases, of being accused of misconduct and negligence. In the latter case, the funds of the IAHs may be considered to be a liability of the Islamic bank, thus jeopardising its solvency.
